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attention on the text, because it is tightly packed, heavily foot-
noted, and the subject matter sometimes gets a little involved,
or just dull.
The reader could not wish for better guides into the ma-
terial. The index is first rate. Appendix I, a table of United
States treaties, is useful. Appendix II deals with the interna-
tional law standard in the treaty practice of other selected states.
Perhaps it is not permissible to draw any conclusions about the
general topic from the fact that the practices of all save one
of the old (pre-World War II) major powers, including Nazi
Germany and the U.S.S.R., do not appear too dissimilar from
U.S.A. practice in regard to treaty references to the interna-
tional standard. The exception was Japan, but the possible im-
plications of this escape the reviewer.
Covey T. Oliver*
INTRODUCTION TO CML PROCEDURE, by Alison Reppy. Dennis &
Co., Buffalo, 1954. Pp. xiv, 860. $8.50.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CML PROCEDURE, by Bernard C. Gavit.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1953. Pp. xi, 582. $8.50.
Legal education has not been impervious to the criticism
it has received from the bar in recent years. Although much of
this criticism has been uninformed and histrionic, some has been
reasoned and constructive. The latter has stimulated consider-
able self-examination on the part of law schools that has not
been merely narcissistic in character. Self-appraisal has re-
vealed a wide disparity of views as to what law schools can
and should teach. This is most forcefully displayed in the area
of procedural courses by the number and variety of new case-
books.' These books range widely from the "survey" courses
* Professor of Law, University of California (Berkeley).
1. In addition to the two casebooks reviewed here, see HAYS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1947); ATKINSON & CHADBOURN, CASES AND
OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1948); MICHAEL, THE ELEMENTS OF
LEGAL CONTROVERSY (1948); SCOTT & SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1950); CLEARY, CASES ON PLEADING AND RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1951); BLUME & REED, PLEAD-
ING AND JOINDER, CASES AND STATUTES (1952); CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEAD-
ING (1952); VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE
AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1952); BROWN, VESTAL & LADD, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1953); FIELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A
BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1953).
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through those that are devoted to intensive studies of limited
topics such as joinder, federal procedure, or common law plead-
ing. One book even couples the topics of judicial administration
with both civil and criminal procedure. A few civil procedure
casebooks cover evidence and trial practice as well as pleading.
Several strive to instill the attitude of evaluation, while others
concentrate exclusively on expounding detailed information.
Two of these casebooks, Reppy, Introduction to Civil Pro-
cedure and Gavit, Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure are
illustrative of two divergent views of what the content of a
course in civil procedure should be. Both are apparently de-
signed for the beginner's course in procedure, and Dean Reppy's
book assumes that some additional courses in procedure will
follow.
Dean Reppy's book is limited entirely to common law plead-
ing except for frequent unconvincing attempts to reassure stu-
dents of the practicality of common law materials. After an
introductory chapter dealing with such preliminary matters as
court systems, jurisdiction and summons, the bulk of the book
(almost 400 pages) is devoted to the forms of action, with con-
siderable attention paid to such "theological" questions as
whether the action on the case was originated by the Statute
of Westminster IH or whether the "revolutionary" view that
the Statute had nothing to do with the origin of this form of
action is the correct view. For each form of action there is a
subsection entitled "Status Under Modern Codes and Practice
Acts" which the editor explains in the preface is inserted "with
the idea of developing in the student's mind the psychology of
present-day usefulness of the subject" and which he further
asserts contains cases decided under "modern Codes and Prac-
tice Acts, which take their rule directly from the common law."
The concept of "modern" used in the book appears to be that
of the historian, since there is only one such illustrative case
as late as 1939, and approximately half of the "modern" cases
are dated in the 1800's; all but two are New York cases decided
under a code not truly "modern" in view of significant advances
made by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly
absent are cases and discussion of the Federal Rules, except
for two meager pages in the first chapter and one aberrant case
where the federal court felt obligated to apply an archaic Dela-
ware statute of limitations.
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Dean Reppy's preface candidly discloses that he has ex-
perienced initial difficulty in making students understand how
"practical" and important the study of common law pleading
is. In fairness to him, the reviewer's criticism stems almost
entirely from a fundamental difference ,of viewpoint concerning
the wisdom of this method of introducing students to procedure.
Far from being "valuable as an exercise in legal logic" as the
introduction states that a study of common law pleading is,
such a course is likely to prove destructive of ability to reason
clearly because it breeds the narrow technical frame of mind
that has given the word "legalistic" a derogatory content in the
vocabulary of many laymen and social scientists. Perhaps Dean
Reppy and a few other teachers have the exceptional ability
required to make a course of this nature interesting to stu-
dents; the reviewer seriously doubts if there are many who
possess such talents. And even those few may be wasting tal-
ents that could better be utilized in teaching a modern course
in procedure that would use common law pleading only for the
very limited purpose of explaining why the modern rule was
adopted, how it represents a significant advance over the com-
mon law or early code rule and how its application must be
constantly supervised to assure that it does not become stulti-
fied.
Moreover, the reviewer believes that teaching the replication
de injuria, the special traverse, repleader and other similar mat-
ters that are completely archaic is unlikely to further the "brain
washing" objective stated in the preface of trying to "remove
from the student's mind the notion that the subject is obsolete."
As a means of accomplishing this Crogate's Case is presented
without benefit of the devastating contemporary criticism of
special pleading based on it, entitled "Crogate's Case: A Dialogue
in ye Shades of Special Pleading Reform."'2
If one desires to teach a casebook course in common law
pleading Dean Reppy's book is a useful one. The cases are well
selected for that purpose and the editor has made generous use
of the more recent historical researches on the subject, such as
Fifoot.3 But in the reviewer's opinion such a course should be
taught qua history rather than as procedure. The reviewer
shares Dean Reppy's optimism that procedure can be made in-
2. HAYES, CROGATE'S CASE: A DIALOGUE IN YE SHADES ON SPECIAL PLEADING
REFORM, reprinted in 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417 (2d ed. 1938).
3. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW (1949).
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teresting, but believes that the way to accomplish this is to
place the cases and concepts in the context of current proce-
dural problems in modern litigation, and to make use of draft-
ing problems and case records, with major emphasis upon the
Federal Rules.
The late Dean Gavit's casebook differs materially. It is
obviously designed to convey a maximum of informational
details about modern procedure without the use of common law
pleading. It neither attempts to develop reasoning power nor
to encourage critical evaluation. This is manifest from the pref-
atory remark that the "principal asset for mastery of procedure
is a good memory." The book is suitable for a survey course
where the major objective is familiarization of students with
all of the concepts of procedure. Its greatest asset is the extent
of its coverage, which includes everything from the commence-
ment of action through the trial and appellate stages.
But such broad coverage is impossible without sacrifice of
other important objectives. The book has sacrificed any attempt
either to present the major problems of procedure, such as con-
gested court calendars, time lags, and expense of litigation, or
to evaluate any of the rules and the way courts apply them. It
is greatly to be regretted that one with the broad experience
and knowledge of the editor did not include critical comments
or questions for the benefit of students and for use in classroom
discussions. While the book follows the salutary trend toward
emphasizing the Federal Rules, it does not present either the
important comparisons of such rules with those of code pleading
or the sharp controversies over such matters as the summary
judgment procedure, the "cause of action" versus "claim for re-
lief," the abuse of discovery procedures in the "big case," or
the problems created by the union of law and equity.
The material in Dean Gavit's book is arranged chronologi-
cally, beginning with the commencement of the action and tak-
ing each successive procedural step. Some of them necessarily
receive only summary treatment. Others, such as motions, the
manner of pleading, and discovery are ruthlessly abridged. The
extremely important topic of discovery is summarily treated in
10 pages, 7 of which consist of the Hickman case.4 On the other
hand, the use of demonstrative evidence takes up 12 pages al-
though the book makes no real attempt to cover the topic of
4. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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evidence. Likewise, the topic of selection of the jury encom-
passes a disproportionate space of 17 pages and the introduction
of evidence takes up another 10 pages. Most of the important
cases in the book are severely (though skillfully) edited.
Among the better features of the book is its painstaking
effort to see that no important procedural step or concept (ex-
cept perhaps enforcement of judgments and a few other mat-
ters) is omitted from the curriculum. Use of the book would
assure that the student would be familiar with every major
procedural step. Another unique salutary feature is Dean Gavit's
inclusion of relevant ethical considerations along with the
procedural information. Finally, the supplement containing the
Federal Rules is a distinct advantage lacking in many proce-
dural casebooks.
In some respects both books are alike. Both seem to be based
upon a conception of law as simply a body of rules applied
rather mechanically by a judge who, unless his memory is dim
or analysis is faulty, cannot help but deduce the correct rule.
No intimation is made that judges may exercise creative func-
tions even in dealing with mundane problems of procedure.
Similarly neither book makes an attempt to instill an attitude
of evaluation of the procedural rules they expound. Neverthe-
less, there is a subtle underlying premise to Dean Reppy's book
that the essence of common law pleading should be preserved
intact (or perhaps more correctly, that we should return to that
system). Likewise, in Dean Gavit's book there is an inference
of a preference for retention of the status quo. Neither of these
preferences corresponds to those of the reviewer who would
choose to regard any set of procedural rules as merely a means
of achieving a desideratum of a speedy and inexpensive deci-
sion on the merits of the case as determined by principles of
substantive law. Procedural rules are not immutable but are
constantly in need of surveillance by lawyers, judges and law
teachers to ascertain whether they are operating to advance
or retard this objective.
Glen E. Weston*
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University.
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